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The impact of demand growth on the collusion possibilities is investigated in
a Cournot supergame where market growth may trigger future entry and the
collusive agreement is enforced by the most profitable ‘grim trigger strategies’
available. It is shown that even in situations where perfect collusion can be
sustained after entry, coping with a potential entrant in a market which is
growing over time may completely undermine any pre-entry collusive plans of
the incumbent firms. This is because, before entry, a deviation and the following
punishment phase may become more attractive thanks to their additional effect
in terms of delaying entry.
Introduction
A standard result in supergame theoretic models assessing the factors
that influence collusion is that demand growth facilitates collusion.1
The intuition is very simple. The higher the rate of demand growth, the
higher is the importance of future profits from collusion relative to the
current gain from deviating. This is the so called pro-collusive intrinsic
effect of demand growth on collusion.
An important problem regarding this standard result, however, is
that it contrasts with the views expressed by the European Commission
(EC) and the Court of First Instance (CFI) when analyzing merger
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1. See, for instance, Motta (2004, pp. 163–164) and Tirole (1988, p. 250).
cases. Both the EC and the CFI usually interpret demand growth as
a factor hindering collusion. The widely discussed Airtours/First Choice
merger is a case in point.2 One interesting feature of this case is that,
even though both the EC and the CFI agreed on their view of demand
growth’s effect (which contrasts with the view of standard literature
on the topic), they disagreed about the extent of demand growth. In
1999, the EC prohibited the merger between Airtours and First Choice
claiming that the proposed merger would have created a situation of
joint dominance by Airtours/First Choice and two other competitors in
the UK short-haul package holiday market.3 However, in June 2002 the
CFI overturned the EC decision.4
One of the reasons that led the CFI to annul the EC decision was that
the EC analysis of demand growth was considered to be flawed. While
the EC included low demand growth and substantial barriers to market
entry in the list of market characteristics which would facilitate joint
dominance,5 the CFI found that: (i) the market was one of strong demand
growth;6 (ii) there are no significant barriers to market entry;7 and (iii)
the EC had underestimated the extent to which entry by new firms
(especially small UK tour operators or foreign tour operators) might be
feasible.8 On this basis, the CFI concluded that “the lack of barriers to
market entry is likely to allow potential competitors to gain access to, and
offer their products on, the relevant market and, therefore, to take fast
and effective action in the event of the large tour operators . . . give rise to
a situation of under-supply.” (paragraph 269 of the CFI Judgement).9, 10
2. Airtours/First Choice, Case IV/M. 1524 (Decision of September 22, 1999).
3. Joint dominance effects of mergers refers to the possibility that firms reach a collusive
agreement after the merger.
4. Airtours p/c v. Commission of the European Communities, Case T-342/99 (June 6, 2002).
5. See paragraphs 121 and 126 of the CFI Judgement.
6. In the CFI Judgment it is stated that “the market had been marked by a clear
tendency to considerable growth over the last decade . . . In that context of growth, . . . the
Commission was not entitled to conclude that the market development was characterized
by low growth, which was, in this instance, a factor conducive to the creation of a collective
dominant position by the three remaining large tour operators.” (paragraph 133).
7. See paragraphs 98 and 263 of the CFI Judgement.
8. See, for instance, paragraphs 215 and 266 of the CFI Judgement.
9. According to Garrod et al. (2002), the CFI Decision on the Airtours case provides
considerable guidance to merging companies as to the facts that need to be developed
to avoid the application of the joint dominance doctrine. “Specifically, facts should be
developed to establish . . . that demand in the market is increasing—which should give
members of any alleged oligopoly the incentive to cheat and which would encourage new
entry.” (p. 3)
10. Ivaldi et al. (2003) point out that another example illustrating the divergence
between the conclusions of the literature focusing on the intrinsic pro-collusive effect
of demand growth and the opinions expressed by the EC is given by the recent guidelines
for market analysis and the assessment of significant market power in electronic com-
munications markets. In fact, in Annex II of the EC Decision 676/2002/EC (OJ L 108, of
24/04/2002) it is stated that “[t] wo or more undertakings can be found in a joint dominant
The motivation offered by the CFI for why increasing demand
without (significant) barriers to entry hinders collusion appears to be in
line with the views expressed by Ivaldi et al. (2003). According to these
authors, one possible reason for this discrepancy between economic
theory and competition practice is that previous literature analyzing
demand growth effects on collusion has relied on an assumption that is
clearly unwarranted. Specifically, it “assumes that the number of market
participants remains fixed despite market growth, while in practice, en-
try may be easier in growing markets” (p. 28). Indeed, growing markets
are likely to allow entry by new firms which should hinder collusion.
As a result, it seems important to try and understand whether the
detrimental impact of entry stimulated by market growth on collusion
can outweigh the intrinsic pro-collusive effect of market growth.
The current paper has taken seriously this argument by consider-
ing a simple model in which there are two incumbents and one potential
entrant in a market which is growing over time. Firms engage in an
infinite horizon dynamic game of quantity competition and the entrant
must pay a fixed (sunk) cost upon entering the market. The main goal
of the analysis is to characterize the maximal level of collusion the
incumbents and the entrant can achieve using “grim trigger strategies”
to punish deviations (Friedman (1971)).
Within this framework, we start by analyzing firms’ optimal
behavior after entry and derive the optimal entry date. It is shown that
entry always occurs in equilibrium if sunk entry costs are moderate.
We then turn to the analysis of the pre-entry behavior and charac-
terize the relationship between the market growth rate and the level of
collusion sustainable before entry. We find that when the market growth
is extremely fast, perfect collusion can be sustained both after and before
entry. The pro-collusive intrinsic effect of (the very fast) demand growth
turns out to be sufficiently strong to more than compensate for the
impact of entry which is likely to be stimulated by demand growth
on pre-entry collusion. However, and perhaps more importantly, it is
also shown that even in situations where demand growth is sufficiently
strong so that perfect collusion can be sustained (by three firms) after
entry takes place, it may be the case that no collusion can be sustained
before entry by the two incumbent firms. Coping with a potential entrant
in a market which is growing over time may completely undermine
pre-entry collusive plans. The reason is that in the period of time just
before the optimal entry date along the collusive path (and, by backward
induction, in all previous periods) firms might not resist the temptation
position . . . if . . . the market satisfies a number of appropriate characteristics, in particular
in terms of . . . stagnant or moderate growth on the demand side.”
to deviate because (i) a deviation delays entry (which occurs later on
along the punishment path); and (ii) the first phase of the punishment
works like an extension of the deviation phase because the Cournot
duopoly profits earned by each incumbent firm during that phase exceed
the most collusive individual profits when there are three firms in the
industry. This result, therefore, is important from a policy point of view
because it provides a possible theoretical rationale for why the EC and
the CFI usually consider that higher demand growth is a factor that
makes collusion less of a concern. In addition, it seems consistent with
the Airtours/First Choice merger case mentioned above because, as stated
in a recent article in The Economist,11 “the courts disagreed [with the EC
prohibition decision], ruling that it is difficult to . . . discipline cheating,
and impossible to prevent smaller competitors or new entrants from
expanding supply and spoiling the incumbent’s game.”
To the best of our knowledge, the only paper that studies the impact
of demand growth on collusion when entry is feasible is Capuano (2002).
There exist, however, three major differences between Capuano’s frame-
work and the setting used in this paper. First, the focus of Capuano’s
paper is on perfect collusion sustainability, while the present paper
is also concerned with the characterization of the maximal degree of
collusion consistent with equilibrium (which may be something less
than perfect collusion) and how this maximal degree changes with the
rate of market growth. Second, Capuano’s paper is only able to provide
a limited result regarding the equilibria prior to entry.12 In contrast,
and given that pre-entry behavior seems to be the most relevant for
policy discussion, most of the focus of the current paper is on the
characterization of the pre-entry equilibria. Lastly, while in Capuano’s
model entry is assumed to occur as soon as the entrant expects a positive
NPV of profits, in the current paper entry timing is optimal (and, under
some conditions, may be delayed beyond this point).
Previous research on quantity setting supergames has investigated
the degree of collusion which can be achieved when the number of
market participants is endogenously derived from a free-entry condi-
tion. Different types of incumbent firms’ responses to entry have been
studied. A first possibility is that incumbents use punishment schemes
of the type which has been characterized by Abreu (1986) to make entry
unprofitable and support the joint profit maximum (see, for instance,
11. Silent Orchestration, The Economist, March 31, 2007, at p. 84.
12. Moreover, in Capuano’s paper it is implicitly assumed that the satisfaction of the
incentive compatibility constraint in the very first period of the game is sufficient for pre-
entry incentive compatibility while the current paper shows that this is an indefensible
assumption.
Harrington (1989)).13 A second possibility is studied by Harrington
(1991). This paper considers the situation in which colluding firms, when
facing an entrant, either include the new firm in the collusive agreement
immediately upon entry or forego collusion and trigger to single-shot
Cournot equilibrium output levels. Another plausible response to entry
has been proposed by Friedman and Thisse (1994). Their paper considers
a type of collusion which is not generous to entrants. Entrants’ profits
are in the first period after entry a little better than those correspond-
ing to discounted single-shot Cournot equilibrium. Their output then
increases gradually over time until eventually the entrants become full
partners in the collusive scheme.14 However, all these models, contrary
to the present paper, assume constant demand over time and thus do
not model the process by which entry is triggered in the long-run.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes
the basic model. Section 3 briefly discusses the case in which entry costs
are prohibitive and, therefore, there is no entry triggered by market
growth. In Section 4, we analyze firms’ optimal behavior ex post entry
and characterize the optimal entry date (along the collusive path) when
entry costs are not prohibitive. Section 5 will focus on how market
growth affects the level of collusion that can be sustained before entry
by the incumbent firms. Section 6 studies two possible extensions of the
basic model. In particular, it discusses the case in which there are two
potential entrants and analyzes whether partial collusion between the
two incumbent firms is feasible in this setting. Finally, Section 7 offers
some concluding comments.
 Basic Model
Consider an industry in which there are two incumbents and one
potential entrant. Firms play an infinite horizon game and in each period
of time all active firms (i.e., the two incumbents and the entrant, in
13. If the stage game is Bertrand type and firms face symmetric and constant marginal
costs, then entry can be deterred by the threat of Nash-reversion. Entry never occurs,
unless the entrant anticipates that it will be accommodated in a more inclusive collusive
agreement.
14. There is also a strand in the literature, staring with the seminal study of Green and
Porter (1984), that has formalized the issue of secrete price cutting in a setting where: (i)
demand is subject to exogenous shocks; and (ii) firms’ quantities are private information
but the random market price is publicly observed (imperfect monitoring). Contrary to
perfect observability models of collusion where price wars are a threat that never occurs
in equilibrium, the Green and Porter’s (1984) model does predict the existence of periodic
price wars. These price wars are, however, involuntary in the sense that they are triggered
by states of low demand and not by defection (which does not occur in equilibrium).
This model has been extended by Vasconcelos (2004) to consider the possibility of entry,
allowing the incumbent firms to either punish or accommodate entry when it occurs.
case it has already entered) simultaneously choose an output rate. The
potential entrant has to decide when to enter the industry (if it enters at
all). A one-time (sunk) entry cost K, K ≥ 0, has to be incurred if entry
takes place.15 Active firms offer a homogeneous product and production
is assumed to be costless for all firms. The payoff function of a given firm
is given by the sum of discounted profits, where profits are received at
the end of each period, and the common discount factor is δ ∈ (0, 1).
Assume that, in each period of time t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , market demand
is given by Qt = (1 − pt)µt, where pt denotes the market price in period t
and µ > 1 is the parameter measuring demand growth. Hence, demand
is growing steadily at rate (µ − 1).16 Assume also that µδ < 1.17
Under this set of assumptions, it is easy to show that the profits
in a Cournot–Nash equilibrium for the single-period game played in
period t when there are n firms in the industry are given by18
π ct (n) =
µt
(n + 1)2 . (1)





We will focus on a particular class of subgame perfect Nash equilib-
ria (SPE) of the infinitely repeated game, which we call Most Collusive
Trigger Strategy Equilibrium with Entry (MCTSEE). A MCTSEE is a
SPE where active firms and the potential entrant follow the following
strategies, respectively. Starting from period 0, active firms will produce
in any period t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . } the best collusive sustainable output
consistent with the number of active firms in the market and also with
the discount factor δ > 0.19 This most collusive output rate will continue
to be produced as long as no other active firm has deviated from the
collusive path. In the event of a deviation, active firms permanently
15. Because this is a unique cost to the potential entrant, the size of K can be interpreted
as the “height” of (exogenous) barriers.
16. As pointed out by Tirole (1988), a model of this kind describes the same type of
situation discussed by Rotemberg and Saloner (1986). The only differences are that, on the
one hand, shocks are perfectly anticipated and there is a trend, on the other.
17. Note that µδ can be interpreted as an adjusted discount factor which accounts for
market growth.
18. See Appendix A.
19. The continuity offered by the Cournot model allows us to focus the analysis on the
characterization of the maximal degree of collusion consistent with equilibrium and which
may be something less than perfect collusion. In addition, it is worth remarking that the
Cournot model employed here offers a richness of comparative statics results that do not
obtain under classical Bertrand competition. It is well known that with this alternative
mode of competition, as long as the discount factor is above a critical threshold value,
then any collusive price can be sustained (even the monopoly price).
revert to the single-period Nash equilibrium (Friedman (1971)).20 The
potential entrant will enter the industry in the period in which the NPV
of its expected post entry profits is maximal. In case entry occurs, the
potential entrant becomes an active firm and should, therefore, follow
the strategy of an active firm for the remainder of the horizon.
Incumbents Õ Reaction to Entry
Before proceeding with the analysis, however, it is important to explain
why we consider that the incumbents incorporate the entrant in a
more inclusive agreement as soon as it enters rather than credibly
threaten the entrant to revert to an equilibrium in which the entrant
would be minmaxed so as to deter entry.21 Three kinds of arguments
lead us to believe that the latter type of behavior by the incumbent
firms is unlikely in many circumstances. First, as was highlighted by
Besanko et al. (2004, p. 302), “accommodated entry is typical in markets
with growing demand.” Second, collusion is illegal and firms in the
industry are certainly aware whenever self-enforcing agreements are
being implemented. Hence, an entrant which is minmaxed by colluding
incumbent firms will have very strong incentives to denounce the
existence of the collusive agreement to the antitrust authorities so as to
earn a per-period Cournot individual profit rather than its zero minmax
payoff.22 Lastly, as pointed out by Friedman and Thisse (1994), entry is in
many industries a reality incumbent firms have to live with. Therefore,
in these situations, “intuition suggests that the incumbent firms might
prefer to recontract and include the entrant into a revamped collusive
agreement” (p. 272).
20. It is important to explain at this point why we consider Cournot–Nash rever-
sion while it is well known that, for quantity-setting supergames, Abreu (1986) has
characterized a class of more sophisticated and more severe punishments than standard
“grim trigger strategies.” First, as pointed out by Harrington (1991, p. 1089) “it is quite
natural to think of a punishment strategy as being an industry norm with respect to
firm conduct . . . Furthermore, once a norm is in place, firms may be hesitant to change
it . . . Thus, even though the norm might not be the best in some sense (for example, it
might not be a most severe punishment strategy), firms might seem choose to maintain
it if it seems to work. In light of this interpretation of a punishment strategy, it seems
plausible that the grim trigger strategy would be a commonly used norm.” Second, the
use of standard trigger strategies has the advantage of requiring simple calculations and
also of being easily understood by market participants.
21. Minmaxing an entrant consists in treating the entrant as a defector from the
collusive agreement (say, because the potential entrant was supposed to produce zero
along the equilibrium output path). Because in our setting the minmax payoff is zero
independently of the demand level, a firm’s security level is a discounted payoff also
equal to zero. Hence, if for some (sufficiently high) values of the discount factor security
level punishment can be supported as a SPE, then by credibly threaten the entrant to revert
to the equilibrium where it obtains zero profit as a continuation payoff, entry could be
prevented.
22. Whistle-blowing mechanisms to deter collusion have been studied in detail by
Motta and Polo (2003), Harrington (2008), and Aubert et al. (2006).
A Benchmark Case: Prohibitive Entry Barriers
In this section, we briefly consider the benchmark case in which the
number of market participants cannot be affected by market growth
because K is assumed to be prohibitive (e.g., because of needed patents).
Let q̃t ≡ qtµt denote the individual collusive output in period t
when there are n firms in the market, where qt ∈ [ 12n , 1n+1 ).23 Denote
by π̃t(qt, n) the individual collusive profit in period t when each firm
produces q̃t, and by πdt (qt, n) the largest one-shot profit that a firm can
make in period t when q̃t is supposed to be produced by each firm. Some
algebra shows that:24
π̃t(qt, n) = (1 − nqt)qtµt , (3)
πdt (qt, n) =
(




Now, take any period of time t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . }. Then, at period t,
perfect collusion can be supported as a MCTSEE by the n firms in the






























1 − µδ , (6)
which in turn implies that the adjusted discount factor µδ must be
sufficiently high
µδ ≥ (n + 1)
2
6n + n2 + 1 ≡ µ̃δ(n). (7)
Now, two notes are in order. First, the previous condition clearly
shows that, for a given number of firms n, perfect collusion will be easier
23. As shown in Appendix A, the Cournot individual output in period t when there
are n firms in the market is given by qct (n) = µt/(n + 1). This implies that q̃t has to be
greater or equal than the perfect collusion individual output rate µt/(2n) , but at the same
time lower than qct (n).
24. See Appendix A for details.
25. When n firms perfectly collude in period t, then qt = 1/(2n).
to sustain as a MCTSEE as µ increases.26 The intuition is simple. Because
the number of market participants cannot be affected by market growth,
the more the market is growing the higher is the importance of future
profits from collusion relative to the current gain from deviating. This
is the so called intrinsic pro-collusive effect of demand growth. Second,





(6n + n2 + 1)2 > 0. (8)
The conventional wisdom behind this result is that, ceteris paribus, as
the number of firms in the market increases, it becomes more difficult to
sustain perfect collusion as a MCTSEE. This implies that, if entry sunk
costs turn out not to be prohibitive and there is a potential entrant, the
number of firms increases (at least potentially) and this leads to the fact
that collusion may be less likely.27
In what follows, we analyze the case in which the entry sunk costs
are not prohibitive and, therefore, demand growth may stimulate new
entry. We start by analyzing firms’ optimal behavior after entry and
derive the optimal entry date. We then turn to the analysis of the pre-
entry behavior. In particular, we will study the relationship between the
maximal level of pre-entry collusion and the parameter µ measuring
market growth.
Sustaining Collusion Ex Post Entry
The next proposition identifies and characterizes the maximal level of
collusion (consistent with equilibrium which may be something less
than perfect collusion) that can be sustained after entry. In particular, it
shows that if perfect collusion cannot be sustained after entry, then this
maximal level of (nonperfect) collusion sustainable after entry increases
in the market growth rate.
Proposition 1: Suppose entry occurs at time t′. Then, the best collusive
individual quantity that can be sustained in period t ≥ t′ as a MCTSEE is
given by q∗(µ, δ)µt, where
26. Put another way, perfect collusion is easier to sustain as a MCTSEE if the market
is growing (which means µ > 1) than if the market were shrinking (which would mean
µ < 1).
27. As pointed out by Motta (2004, p. 143), “Suppose . . . that both the entrant and the
incumbent firms follow an accommodating strategy, with the entrant taking part in the
(explicit or tacit) collusive behaviour. Because the larger the number of firms the less likely
that collusion can be sustained, entry might break the collusive outcome. All the more so
because if a new firm does enter and takes its share of the industry collusive profits, more
entrants will be induced to follow the same strategy, and sooner or later collusion will be
unsustainable.”
q ∗(µ, δ) =

4 − 3µδ
16 − 4µδ , if µδ < 4/7
1
6
, if µδ ≥ 4/7
. (9)
Moreover, if µδ < 4/7, then q∗(µ, δ) decreases with µ.
Proof . For any t ≥ t′, n = 3. So, collusion will be sustainable as a




δi−tπ̃i (qt, 3) ≥ πdt (qt, 3) +
∞∑
i=t+1
δi−tπ ci (3) . (10)
















(1 − 3qt)qt µ
t








1 − µδ . (12)
Now, multiplying both sides of the previous condition by (1 −
µδ)/µt, the problem becomes stationary (because the µt terms cancel
out in the previous ICC, each period looks like the first one) and the
previous condition is equivalent to





(1 − µδ) + δµ
16
. (13)
Hence, given δ > 0 and µ > 1, period t′s best individual collusive output
is equal to q∗(µ, δ)µt, where q∗(µ, δ) is the level of qt for which the
previous ICC is binding. Some algebra shows that:28
q ∗(µ, δ) =

4 − 3µδ
16 − 4µδ , if µδ < 4/7
1
6
, if µδ ≥ 4/7
. (14)
In addition, if µδ < 4/7, very simple algebra shows that
28. When the ICC (13) is satisfied with equality, it is a quadratic equation in qt and has
more than one solution. We are only interested, however, in the smallest (most collusive)
solution that falls in the range qt ∈ [1/(2n), 1/(n + 1)) . More specifically, after entry n = 3




(4 − µδ)2 < 0. (15)
This completes the proof. 
Corollary 1: Perfect collusion can be sustained ex post entry as a MCT-




Proof . Because in a perfect collusion scenario the individual output rate
in period t equals µt/6 (when there are three firms in the market), then
the critical discount factor for perfect collusion to be sustainable ex post
entry as a MCTSEE follows directly from (9).29 
Notice now that from (9), one has that, for a given period t
following entry, the individual profit of each firm in the market will be
equal to π̃t(1/6, 3) if µδ ≥ 4/7 and π̃t ((4 − 3µδ)/(16 − 4µδ), 3) otherwise.






(5µδ + 4)(4 − 3µδ)
16(4 − µδ)2 , if µδ < 4/7
1
12
, if µδ ≥ 4/7
. (17)
Armed with the above expression for ex post entry individual
profits, it is now possible to look at the entrants’ optimal behavior.
The next proposition derives the optimal entry time along the collusive
equilibrium path.30
Proposition 2: Let
t1(µ, δ, K , 










 is given by equation (17) and t1(µ, δ, K, 
) decreases in µ. When
collusion is supported by MCTSEE, then the optimal entry time is given by
t̂1 ∈ {t1, t1}, where
t1 = max{t ∈ N : t ≤ t1(µ, δ, K , 
)} (19)
t1 = min{t ∈ N : t ≥ t1(µ, δ, K , 
)}. (20)
29. The same conclusion could also be obtained from equation (7), µ̃δ(3) = 4/7.
30. As shown in Appendix B, the optimal entry time is not necessarily the first time
period at which the Net Present Value (NPV) of the entrant’s profits is non negative.
Proof . Let us start by regarding t as a continuous variable. Moreover, let
Vc(t) denote present discounted value of the entrant’s profits along the
collusive path when it enters in period t and expects to be accommodated





 − δt K = δ
tµt

1 − µδ − δ
t K , (21)
where 
 is given by equation (17). If t is regarded as being a continuous





The first-order condition (FOC) of this maximization problem
implies that, at the optimal (continuous) entry time, the following holds
µt = ln δ
ln(δµ)




which in turn implies that
t1(µ, δ, K , 









Notice that in order for t1(µ, δ, K, 
) ≥ 1, one must have that
K ≥ µ
 ln δµ
(ln δ)(1 − δµ) ≡ K . (25)
Making use of (24), one can now carry out a comparative statics
exercise to evaluate how t1(µ, δ, K, 
) is affected by demand growth:
dt1
dµ
























(1 − δµ) + (1 − δµ(1 − ln(δµ))) ln µ
ln(δµ)(ln µ)2µ(1 − δµ) ,
(27)
















(4 − µδ)3 > 0, if µδ < 4/7
0, if µδ ≥ 4/7
. (29)
So, from (27)–(29), it can be easily concluded that dt1(µ, δ, K, 
)/dµ
is negative.
Now, in order to conclude the proof, one has to take into account
that, in general, t1(µ, δ, K, 
) will not happen to be an integer. This being
the case, the optimal discrete entry time chosen by the entrant is given
by t̂1 ∈ {t1, t1}, where
t1 = max {t ∈ N : t ≤ t1 (µ, δ, K , 
)} , (30)
t1 = min {t ∈ N : t ≥ t1 (µ, δ, K , 
)} . (31)
In particular, t̂1 = t1 if Vc(t1) > Vc(t1). Otherwise, t̂1 = t1.

If t was regarded as a continuous variable, then t1(µ, δ, K, 
) would
be the optimal entry time along the collusive path. It is important to note,
however, that the model of collusion is based on discrete time and, thus,
the optimal entry time must be restricted to be an integer. So, in order to
identify the optimal entry date, the entrant compares the (integer) entry
dates on either side of t1(µ, δ, K, 
) and optimally chooses the one for
which its present discounted value of profits is highest.
It should be noted as well that a growing market (µ > 1) is essential
for entry to take place along the collusive path. The previous proposition
assumes that K ≥ K , where K is defined by equation (25), in order to
make t1(µ, δ, K, 
) ≥ 1. If the market were stationary, that is, if µ = 1,
then, from equation (25), K = 
/(1 − δ), which in turn implies that the
present discounted value of the entrant’s profits when it enters in period
t ≥ 1 and expects to be accommodated in a more inclusive agreement
would be equal to zero, Vc(t) = 0 for any t ≥ 1 (see equation (21)). Hence,
a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for entry to occur along the
collusive path is that µ > 1.31
31. If there is no growth (µ = 1), then either the entrant enters in period t = 0 (if
collusion can be sustained by three firms ex post entry and the entry cost K can be covered
by the present discounted value of the entrant’s profits when it is accommodated in a
more inclusive agreement) or it never enters.
Sustaining Collusion Pre-Entry
In this section, we study how the market growth affects the maximal
level of collusion that can be sustained pre-entry as a MCTSEE. In order
to address this issue, however, we need to determine first the optimal
entry time off the equilibrium path, that is, the optimal entry time in
case firms play as Cournot oligopolists in every period that follows
entry. This is done in the following lemma.
Lemma 1: Let
t2 (µ, δ, K ) = 1ln µ ln
(




where t2(µ, δ, K) decreases in µ. If firms play as Cournot oligopolists in every
stage game that follows entry, then the optimal entry time is given by t̂2 ∈
{t2, t2}, where
t2 = max {t ∈ N : t ≤ t2 (µ, δ, K )} (33)
t2 = min {t ∈ N : t ≥ t2 (µ, δ, K )} . (34)
Proof . Let us start by regarding t as a continuous variable. In addition,
let Vp(t) denote the present discounted value of the entrant’s profits
when it enters in period t and expects that entry will be followed by
Cournot competition in every stage game:
V p(t) = δt
∞∑
i=t
δi−tπ ci (3) − δt K =
δtµt
16(1 − µδ) − δ
t K , (35)
where the second equality makes use of equation (1).
When t is regarded as a continuous variable, then the optimal





From the FOC of this maximization problem, some algebra shows
that the optimal entry time is given by
t2(µ, δ, K ) = 1ln µ ln
(








(ln δ)(1 − µδ) ≡ K̃ (38)
in order for t2 (µ, δ, K ) ≥ 1.













(1 − δµ) + (1 − δµ(1 − ln(δµ))) ln µ
ln(δµ)(ln µ)2µ(1 − δµ) ,
(39)
which turns out to be negative for all K ≥ K̃ .
Now, in general, t2(µ, δ, K) will not happen to be an integer. So,
the optimal discrete entry time chosen by the entrant is given by t̂2 ∈
{t2, t2}, where
t2 = max {t ∈ N : t ≤ t2 (µ, δ, K )} , (40)
t2 = min {t ∈ N : t ≥ t2 (µ, δ, K )} . (41)
In particular, t̂2 = t2 if Vp(t2) > Vp(t2). Otherwise, t̂2 = t2.

So, similar to what happens along the collusive path (see Proposi-
tion 2), the entrant will compare the integer entry dates on either side of
t2(µ, δ, K) (the optimal entry time off the equilibrium path if t is regarded
as a continuous variable) and chooses the one for which the present
discounted value of its expected profits is highest.
Two more notes regarding this result are worth remarking. First,
and similarly to what was mentioned with respect to the result in
Proposition 2, a growing market is essential in order for entry to occur off
the equilibrium path. Lemma 1 assumes that K ≥ K̃ , where K̃ is given
by equation (38), in order to make t2(µ, δ, K) ≥ 1. If the market were
stationary, that is, if µ = 1, then, from equation (38), K̃ = 1/[16(1 − δ)],
which in turn implies that the present discounted value of the entrant’s
profits when it enters in period t ≥ 1 (and expects that entry will be
followed by Cournot competition in every period that follows entry)
would be equal to zero, Vp(t) = 0 for any t ≥ 1 (see equation (35)). Hence,
a necessary condition for entry to take place along the punishment path
is that µ > 1. Second, as the market grows faster, entry off the equilib-
rium path should optimally take place earlier, provided that the entry
cost K remains above K̃ (which itself is increasing in µ).32 This result
has the following implication. Take a time period in which entry has
32. Making use of equation (38), some algebra shows that ∂ K̃/∂µ = (ln µδ + 1 −
µδ)/(16(ln δ)(1 − µδ)2), which turns out to be positive for any pair (δ, µ) such that
µ > 1, δ ∈ (0, 1) and µδ < 1.
not occurred yet and suppose that one of the incumbent firms deviates
from the collusive agreement. Then, firms will enter into a punishment
composed of two distinct phases: a first phase where the incumbents play
as Cournot duopolists and a second one in which the incumbents and
the entrant form a Cournot triopoly. Now, because t2(µ, δ, K) decreases
in µ, when the market grows faster, we will have a shorter first phase
of the punishment in which firms earn the Cournot duopoly profits
in each period and a longer second phase of the punishment in which
firms earn the Cournot triopoly profits in each period. In other words, an
increase in the market growth rate induces a decrease in the punishment
continuation value. As entry occurs sooner along the punishment path,
the punishment becomes harsher, which contributes to an increase in
the maximal level of pre-entry sustainable collusion.
Let us now turn to the analysis of the conditions for pre-entry
incentive compatibility. Assume that µδ ≥ 4/7 so that in the time periods
following entry the incumbent firms and the entrant will be able to
achieve perfect collusion using grim trigger strategies to punish devi-
ations (Corollary 1). Consider now a period t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , t̂1 − 1}. Then,




















δi−tπ ci (3), (42)
where qt ∈ [1/4, 1/3) and the collusive quantity that each incumbent
firm is supposed to produce in period t equals q̃t ≡ qtµt (see Appendix
A for the derivation of profits). In addition, t̂1 and t̂2 are, respectively,
given by Proposition 2 and Lemma 1.
The left hand side of condition (42) represents the present value
(from the perspective of period t money) of the collusive profits that an
incumbent firm earns along the collusive path when each incumbent
firm is producing q̃t = qtµt in period t < t̂1 and q∗(µ, δ) = 1/6 from
period t̂1 onwards.33 Notice that from period t to period t̂1 − 1 there
are the two incumbent firms in the industry, while from period t̂1
onwards we have also the entrant as an active firm in the industry (see
Proposition 2). The right hand side of condition (42) considers instead
what happens if a firm deviates in period t. As already mentioned,
33. Remember that from Proposition 1 (equation (9)), one has that for µδ ≥ 4/7, the
best collusive (normalized) quantity that can be sustained by the incumbent firms and the
entrant as a MCTSEE in the periods following entry is q∗(µ, δ) = 1/6.
this deviation will trigger a two-phase punishment. First, from period
t + 1 until period t + t̂2 − 1, the deviating firm gets the Cournot duopoly
profits. Then, from period t + t̂2 onwards, the deviating firm earns the
Cournot triopoly profits (see Lemma 1).
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1 − µδ .
(44)
The previous ICC implicitly defines a set of feasible values of qt ∈
[1/4, 1/3) that can be sustained in period t as a MCTSEE.
Even though the ex post entry problem is clearly not stationary, in
the following lemma it is shown that considering the ICC in the time
period just before entry is sufficient for pre-entry incentive compatibility.
In other words, collusion possibilities decrease as the (optimal) entry
date approaches.
Lemma 2: To satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint in period t̂1 − 1,
where t̂1 is defined in Proposition 2, is a sufficient condition to ensure pre-entry
incentive compatibility.
Proof . See Appendix C. 
The intuition behind this result is as follows. The incumbent firms’
incentives to deviate increase as they approach the end of the most
attractive (first) phase of the collusive path. In particular, in the time
period just before the optimal entry date pre-entry (incumbent) firms
face a short period of higher profits before entry will occur. The firms
therefore face a greater incentive to deviate during this period because
future profits become less important relative to the current one-period
gain from deviating. The immediate demand growth facing each firm is
negative at this point.
The two following propositions identify sufficient conditions in
order for two types of pre-entry equilibria to arise.
Proposition 3: Let K > µ2 K̃ , where K̃ is given by equation (38). Then,
for any µ > 1, there exists a δ̃ ∈ (0, 1) such that if 4/7 ≤ µδ ≤ µδ̃, then no
collusion can be sustained as a MCTSEE in any period before entry takes place.
Proof . See Appendix C. 
Hence, combining this result with Corollary 1, one concludes that
even when perfect collusion can be sustained (by three firms) after entry
takes place,34 it may be the case that no collusion can be sustained as
a MCTSEE before entry by the two incumbent firms. The intuition is
as follows. Take the period of time immediately before entry occurs
along the collusive path, period t̂1 − 1, and notice that π ct (2)/µt = 1/9 >
π ct (1)/(3µ
t) = 1/12 > π ct (3)/µt = 1/16. So, an incumbent firm consider-
ing whether to collude or not in period t̂1 − 1 anticipates that if it decides
to abide by the collusive agreement, then from period t̂1 onwards it
will earn a per-period normalized collusive profit of 1/12. However, if
it deviates in the current period, not only it will earn the respective
deviation profit, but it will also delay entry, which will occur in t̂2
periods of time (rather than next period). Moreover, the first phase
of the punishment is like an extension of the deviation phase because, as
indicated above, the (normalized) Cournot duopoly profits each firm
earns in the subsequent t̂2 − 1 periods (1/9) exceed the (normalized)
perfect collusion profits when there are three firms in the industry (1/12).
Only in the second phase of the punishment the per-period normalized
Cournot profits (1/16) will be smaller than the perfect collusion ones.35
Now, when the discount factor is sufficiently low (and, thus, the adjusted
discount factor µδ is also low), firms attach relatively low weight to
future profits and do not resist the temptation to deviate in period t̂1 − 1.
When this is the case, then, by backward induction, one concludes that
no collusion can be enforced in any other pre-entry period.
This result is important from an antitrust policy standpoint. By
showing that coping with a potential entrant in a market which is
34. Corollary 1 ensures that collusion can be sustained after entry as a MCTSEE
whenever µδ ≥ 4/7.
35. Notice that even though defections and punishments at the early duopoly stage
delay entry, they are not costly in terms of consumers’ welfare when compared to a
collusion scenario. It is true that collusion speeds up entry, but, in this model, the entrant
is assumed to be accommodated in a more inclusive (perfect collusion) agreement. If
entry occurs along the collusive path, the market price stays at the monopoly level, which
is independent of the number of firms in the agreement. If instead a deviation occurs
and a subsequent (two-phase) Cournot punishment is triggered, the equilibrium market
price will be lower than the monopoly price both at the deviation period and during the
punishment (i.e., consumers’ surplus is enhanced).
growing over time may completely undermine pre-entry collusive plans
of the incumbent firms, it provides a potential explanation for the views
of the EC and the CFI that higher demand growth is a factor that makes
collusion less of a concern.
Proposition 4: For any µ > 1, there exists a δ∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that if µδ >
µδ∗ ≥ 4/7, perfect collusion can (also) be sustained as a MCTSEE in any period
before entry takes place.
Proof . See Appendix C. 
So, the sustainability of perfect collusion pre-entry relies on the
adjusted discount factor µδ being sufficiently high (and higher than the
threshold value above which perfect collusion can be sustained as a
MCTSEE after entry, 4/7). Only when the market growth is sufficiently
fast the pro-collusive intrinsic effect of demand growth turns out to
be sufficiently strong to more than compensate for the impact of en-
try which is likely to be stimulated by demand growth on pre-entry
collusion.
Our results therefore reveal that standard supergame models
of collusion may give misleading predictions regarding the effect of
demand growth on the extent of collusion which can be sustained by
the incumbent firms in the market, because they disregard the fact that
market growth may stimulate new entry. The analysis clearly suggests
that, as emphasized by Ivaldi et al. (2003), if entry barriers are moderate,
then it is very important to disentangle the pro-collusive intrinsic effect
of demand growth from the impact of entry which is likely to be
stimulated by market growth. By so doing, one can assess the relative
strengths of these effects so as to try and understand what is the overall
net impact of market growth on the extent of collusion which can be
sustained by the firms in the industry.
In what follows, we present a numerical example where the results
in the two previous propositions will be at work. Remember that we
have restricted attention to the case in which, after entry, the incumbent
firms and the entrant will be able to sustain perfect collusion as a
MCTSEE. So, the relevant region of parameter values (4/7 ≤ µδ < 1)
is represented by all pairs (δ, µ) in between the two dashed lines in
Figure 1.
Now, assuming that K = 1,36 the two thick lines in Figure 1
represent the sufficient conditions identified by Propositions 3 and 4.37
36. It is important to note that other examples were computed, assuming different
values for K, and the results were always qualitatively the same as the ones presented
here for K = 1.
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FIGURE 1. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE (K = 1)
Figure 1 also presents two other curves—curves N and P —which are, for
this specific example, the “true” bounds on the adjusted discount factor
µδ that can be used to identify the regions of parameter values where
the two types of equilibria exist. These two bounds were constructed
making use of the ICC in period t̂1 − 1 and taking into account the
discrete nature of the optimal entry times t̂1 and t̂2. In particular, for
all pairs (δ, µ) in the region between curve P and the dashed line where
µδ = 1, perfect collusion can be sustained before and after entry as a
MCTSEE (the sufficient condition identified in Proposition 4 ensures
that this type of equilibrium will occur in region B of Figure 1). On
the other hand, there is a region of parameter values, composed of all
pairs (δ, µ) which lie in between the dashed line µδ = 4/7 and curve
N, where no collusion can be sustained as a MCTSEE before entry (the
sufficient condition identified in Proposition 3 guarantees that this type
of equilibrium will exist in region A of the above Figure).
Two more notes are worth remarking regarding the example under
consideration. First, notice that the region of parameter values not
explained by the conditions derived in Propositions 3 and 4 is relatively
small. Second, the region where no collusion can be sustained before
entry (associated with the most relevant equilibrium from a policy
standpoint) is substantially larger than the region of parameter values
where perfect collusion is sustained both before and after entry.
Before concluding this section, let us discuss two important limi-
tations of the proposed model.
Optimal Penal Codes
A first limitation of our analysis is that firms employ grim trigger strate-
gies while it is well known that Abreu (1986, 1988) has characterized a
stronger type of punishment strategies with a stick and carrot structure.
This obviously limits the payoffs attainable in the repeated game.38 So,
a natural question that can be raised is whether the results in the paper
regarding the supportability of collusion in the pre-entry duopoly, and
in particular the negative result in Proposition 3, hold good when firms
use Abreu-style threats.
As explained above,39 we restrict attention to this class of simple
punishment strategies for tractability reasons. Characterizing optimal
penal codes in our setting is a very difficult exercise for several rea-
sons. First, the penal code would consist of nonstationary equilibrium
strategies. The strategy profiles would have to take into account that
the quantity produced by each firm along the punishment phases
would have to be contingent on the level of demand in each period
of time following a deviation.40 Second, in constructing the optimal
punishment, one has also to take into account that demand growth might
trigger entry and, therefore, the strategy profiles should also consider
the number of firms in the market in each period of time. Lastly, notice
that, because prices are bounded below by zero, one would have to
assume that, not only firms’ marginal costs are positive,41 but also that
the demand function is piecewise linear (i.e., pt = max{0, 1 − Qt/µt}),
with no restriction imposed on the maximum industry total output. If
instead the quantity space is assumed to be bounded (say, Qt ∈ [0, µt]),
38. As noted by Harrignton (1991, p. 390), “[b]y being able to credibly threaten a
more harsh retribution for defection, an oligopoly can support a wider set of collusive
outcomes.”
39. See Footnote 20.
40. In contrast, for the infinitely repeated Cournot output game with stationary
demand, Abreu (1986) found that, for the case of symmetric punishments, an optimal
punishment strategy takes a very simple form. Not only it has a stick and carrot structure,
but it is also “history-independent” in the following sense: it is always the same punishment
independent of (i) the period of time in which a deviation occurred; and (ii) the (previous)
history of the game.
41. Extending the previous results of the paper to the case in which firms’ marginal
costs are positive is a trivial exercise which would have no qualitative impact on the
results.
then this would imply a lower bound on the static profit. There would be
then no assurance that a most severe punishment strategy equilibrium
could have a first phase (of very high quantity and low profit) lasting
for a single period.
It should be noted, however, that optimal penal codes are not
necessarily “security level” penal codes, that is, an optimal penal code
does not always yield each firm a present discounted value of profits
after a deviation (VP) equal to zero (the lowest payoff a deviating firm
can be held down to by other firms in the industry). As pointed out by
Motta (2004), in order for a firm to abide by a collusive agreement where
stick and carrot strategies are implemented, it must be the case that both
the ICC along the collusive path and the ICC along the punishment
path must hold. Moreover, these two ICCs depend on the harshness
of the punishment being inflicted on a deviating firm. The harsher the
punishment is, the more likely is that the ICC on the collusive path
is satisfied, but, at the same time, a harsher punishment tightens the
ICC on the punishment path. So, for the stationary demand case, Motta
(2004, p. 171) finds that “the best possible strategies (in the sense that
they allow firms to enforce collusion for the largest possible range of
discount factors) are not necessarily those which require the strongest
possible punishment VP = 0. The harsher the punishment, the higher
the discount factor needed for making the return to collusion desirable
enough to participate in the punishment itself. Imposing VP = 0 might
make the IC[C] along the punishment path even tighter than the IC[C]
along the collusive path. This is precisely what happens when a small
number of firms operate in the industry.” As Motta (2004) shows for
the linear demand case, when the number of firms in the industry is
low, having a “security level” penal code would require a too high
discount factor for the punishment to be enforced. As a result, “it is
better to resort to a milder punishment under which VP > 0.” In other
words, the severity of optimal stick and carrot punishments in a Cournot
supergame with linear and static demand has been shown to be lower
when the number of firms in the industry is low. This characteristic of
Abreu-style threats will probably hold as well in a setting where demand
is growing over time. This makes us believe that the negative result of
our paper (put forward in Proposition 3) will still hold good in situations
where there are few firms in the market, which are the most relevant
(and most common) ones in merger analysis.
A second limitation of our analysis is that collusion among incumbents
unambiguously facilitates entry. Even though, as explained above, some
Incumbent's Reaction to Entry
anecdotal evidence suggests that this strategy is usual in growing
markets,42 thinking at the real world, one would think that incumbents
could also collude on trying to keep the entrant out. Examples of
concerted practices that the incumbents may decide to use so as to try
and prevent entry, include: (i) to jointly fighting the entrant with selective
price/output wars in the areas/demand segments the entrant is trying
to penetrate; (ii) lobbying for legislative restrictions on trade, safety or
health issues hurting the potential entrant, especially if this potential
entrant is a foreign firm or a firm using a different technology;43 (iii)
recruiting key employees of the potential entrant; and (iv) boycotting
the entrant’s potential customers and suppliers.44 The adoption of
this type of strategies may or may not entail preventing entry by the
potential entrant. It will certainly, however, yield a more restrictive set
of conditions under which entry is optimal. So, it seems important to
test the robustness of our findings to the use of this alternative class of
(entry deterrence) strategies by the incumbent firms in the industry. This
will be done in our future research. Hopefully, the above model can be
seen as a stepping stone in the direction of a more complete analysis.
Extensions
In this section we discuss two possible extensions of the basic model.
Multiple Entrants
The assumption that entry can occur only once, while the market
continues to grow, is an important limitation of the model. Clearly, in
42. See Section 2.1.
43. Note that, as ponted out by to Harrington (2006, p. 69), “A final tactic to forestall
entry . . . is for cartel members to coordinate in not sharing the technology required for
producing the product. This was apparently done in the graphite electrodes and sorbates
cartels.”
44. From 1992, the Swedish-Swiss industrial combine ABB participated in a cartel
amongst district heating pipe producers across Europe where some of these entry
deterrence strategies have been used against Powerpipe, a cartel outsider considering
entry into new geographic markets like Germany (Case No IV/35.691/E-4: Pre-Insulated
Pipe Cartel, Official Journal of the European Communities, L 24/1, 30.1.1999). As explained
in paragraph 13 of the Decision of the CFI (Fourth Chamber) of 20 March 2002 (Brugg
Rohrsysteme GmbH v Commission of the European Communities), a characteristic feature of
this cartel was “the adoption and implementation of concerted measures to eliminate
Powerpipe, the only major undertaking which was not a member.” In particular, “certain
members of the cartel recruited key employees of Powerpipe and gave Powerpipe to
understand that it should withdraw from the German market. Following the award to
Powerpipe of an important German project, a meeting took place in Düsseldorf in March
1995 which was attended by the six major producers and Brugg . . .. It was decided at
that meeting to organise a collective boycott of Powerpipe’s customers and suppliers. The
boycott was subsequently implemented.”
practice, faster growing markets might have more entry. In our defense,
this analysis is offered as a counterpoint to standard modeling wherein
the number of market participants is presumed to be unchanged
despite the market growth. In addition, it allows us to obtain clear
intuitions on the main results.
While a model with more than one entrant has generality on
its side, it would also be significantly more difficult to obtain results,
especially closed-form solutions for pre-entry equilibria. The main
reason is that if there is a pool of m potential entrants, then, when
analyzing incentive compatibility in a time period before the first entrant
comes into the industry, one will have to consider the existence of m + 1
different phases along the collusive path and also m + 1 different phases
along the punishment path.
In what follows, let us analyze the case in which there are two
potential entrants in the industry (m = 2). Consider first firms’ optimal
behavior after the two entrants have entered the industry. Suppose entry
by the second entrant occurred at time t∗. Then, making use of equation
(7), one may conclude that perfect collusion can be sustained after entry





Now, the relevant question is: when will the entrants decide to
enter the industry? Let t j1 and t
j
2 denote entrant j’s, j = 1, 2, optimal entry
time along the collusive equilibrium path and along the punishment
path, respectively. Clearly, both along the collusive equilibrium path
and along the punishment path, the first entrant will decide to enter
the industry as soon as the NPV of its profits is non negative.45 But
what about the second entrant, that is, how do we determine t21 and
t22? Following a reasoning very similar to the proofs of Proposition 2
and Lemma 1, which is omitted here for the sake of brevity, one may














2µt represents the second entrant’s profits in the post-entry










45. Competition between the two potential entrants explains that the first entrant will
decide to enter as soon as the NPV of its profits covers the entry sunk cost K.
46. To simplify the exposition, in this Section we are ignoring integer constraints.
Armed with the above expressions for entrant 2’s optimal entry
times, it is now possible to consider the case of entry into a triopoly.
Assume that µδ ≥ 25/41 so that in the time periods following entry by
the two potential entrants the four firms in the industry will be able to
achieve perfect collusion using trigger strategies to punish deviations.
Then, consider the time period just before the second entrant would
come in along the collusive path (i.e., consider t = t21 − 1). At this specific
time period, perfect collusion can be sustained as a MCTSEE between

























where t21 and t
2
2 are, respectively, given by equations (46) and (47). Now,
making use of equations (1), (2), and (4), and after some rearranging,
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Now, multiplying both sides of the previous ICC by δt
2
1 −1(1 − µδ), and





−100 + 100µδ + 81(µδ)t22 +1
)
≤ 0. (50)
The previous ICC implicitly defines a threshold value for the
adjusted discount factor, denoted as (µδ), above which the three firms
in the industry can sustain perfect collusion as a MCTSEE in the time
period just before the second entrant would come in along the collusive
path. Figure 2 presents a numerical example where, assuming that K = 1,
this threshold value for the adjusted discount factor is identified.
Remember that we have restricted attention to the case in which,
after entry by the two potential entrants, the four firms in the industry
will be able to sustain perfect collusion as a MCTSEE. Hence, the relevant
region of parameter values (25/41 ≤ µδ < 1) is represented by all pairs
(δ, µ) in between the two dashed lines in Figure 2.
47. When the three firms in the industry perfectly collude in period t21 − 1, then each
of them will produce q c
t21 −1
(1)/3 = µt/6.











FIGURE 2. ENTRY INTO A TRIOPOLY—NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
(K = 1)
The figure illustrates that, as expected, as long as the adjusted
discount factor is sufficiently high, perfect collusion can be sustained
both after and before entry by the second entrant. In addition, and
perhaps more importantly, it also illustrates that there exists a region
of parameter values (namely, the region where 25/41 ≤ µδ < µδ) in
which even though perfect collusion can be sustained (by four firms)
after the two entrants have decided to enter the industry, the two
incumbents and the first entrant will not be able to perfectly collude
before entry by the second entrant. The intuition behind this result is as
follows. Notice that π ct (1)/(4µ
t) = π ct (3)/µt = 1/16 > π ct (4)/µt = 1/25.
Now, consider the period of time just before the second entrant would
come in along the collusive path (t = t21 − 1). At this specific time period,
each of the three firms already in the market anticipates that in case it
decides to respect the collusive agreement, then from period t21 onwards
there will be four firms in the industry earning a per-period normalized
collusive profit equal to 1/16. If, however, one of these three firms
decides to deviate in the current period, then, not only it will earn
the corresponding deviation profits, but it will also delay entry by the
second entrant, which will occur in t22 periods of time (rather than next
period). Moreover, during the first phase of the punishment (i.e., in the
t22 − 1 periods following its deviation), the deviating firm will earn a per-
period Cournot profit equal to 1/16, which exactly coincides with the
(normalized) individual perfect collusion profits when there are four
firms in the industry. Only in the second phase of the punishment,
the per-period (normalized) Cournot profits (1/25) will be smaller than
the perfect collusion ones. So, by deviating in period t21 − 1 a firm will
induce a delay in the effective punishment of t22 periods of time. This being
the case, if the adjusted discount factor is sufficiently low, then the two
incumbents and the first entrant will attach low weight to their future
profits and will not resist the temptation to deviate from the perfect
collusion agreement in period t21 − 1.
Before concluding this section, let us think about the case in which
there are more than two potential entrants. Notice that, also in this
case, it is still true that, when firms in the market consider incentive
compatibility in the time periods just before the first and the second
entrant would come in along the perfect collusion path, a deviation
(in those specific time periods) and the following punishment phase
may become more attractive than abiding by the (perfect) collusive
agreement. Thanks to the additional effect of a deviation (and the
subsequent punishment) in terms of delaying the next entry, a firm in
the market will always be able to obtain: (i) an extension of the deviation
phase in case its deviation occurs just before the first entrant would enter
along the perfect collusion path; and (ii) a delay in the effective punishment
in case its deviation takes place just before the second entrant would
come in along the perfect collusion path. This makes us believe that the
main results of the paper would extend to a more complete model with
a pool of more than two potential entrants.
Partial Collusion
So far, we have focused attention on the analysis of full collusion, that is,
it has been assumed that all active firms in the market were colluding.
An interesting question, however, is to analyze whether partial collusion
between the two incumbent firms is feasible in this setting. In particular,
suppose now that the two incumbent firms are members of a cartel and
should entry occur while the cartel is operating, the entrant becomes a
fringe competitor which in every period picks an output that maximizes
its own profit.48
For every period t in which it is active, the entrant plays a one
period best-response to the cartel’s aggregate output, that is, selects its
output along the following reaction function:
48. The cartel acts as a Stackelberg quantity leader against the Cournot entrant.




where QK,t denotes the cartel output in period t.





Profit maximization for the cartel implies that in each period t it





Substituting (53) into (51) and (52), one obtains the fringe firm
output and the cartel price in each period t




pt = 14 . (55)










So, two notes are in order at this point. First, there is no free-
riding problem in this setting because πK,t = πf ,t.49 Second, and most
importantly, notice that πK,t = πf ,t = π ct (3). In other words, by partially
colluding, cartel members can earn no higher profit than the Cournot
individual profit in each period of time. Partial collusion is therefore
unfeasible in this setting.
It is important to underline at this point that this result is consistent
with the models by Martin (1990) and Shaffer (1995). It is easy to show
that in those models as well, it turns out that if two firms form a cartel and
act as Stackelberg leader against a Cournot fringe composed of a single
firm, then the cartel is not able to earn a (per-period) profit exceeding
the Cournot triopoly profit.
49. This result is in line with Shaffer (1995) who shows that in an industry where n firms
face a linear demand and linear costs and compete in quantities, a cartel composed of k < n
firms and acting as a Stackelberg leader with respect to the fringe does not necessarily
face the free-rider problem. In particular, in Proposition 1 of Shaffer (1995) it is shown that
if the cartel is sufficiently small (k ≤ (n + 1)/2), then each firm in the cartel earns a profit
which is no smaller than that of a fringe firm.
Conclusion
This paper has explored the relationship between demand growth and
collusion in a model where market growth can trigger future entry. This
is an issue which has received very little attention in the previous liter-
ature on tacit collusion, but is of utmost importance for understanding
the relationship between demand growth and firms’ market power in
an industry.
After entry, when the number of market participants can no longer
be affected by market growth, the standard intrinsic pro-collusive effect
of demand growth is shown to prevail: the expected rise in demand
increases the future cost of deviation, which in turn implies that an
increase in the market growth rate induces an increase in the maximal
level of sustainable post entry collusion.
It turns out, however, that, even in situations where demand
growth is sufficiently strong so that perfect collusion can be sustained
after entry, coping with a potential entrant may completely undermine
any pre-entry collusive plans of the incumbent firms. This analysis,
therefore, clearly suggests that, as emphasized by Ivaldi et al. (2003),
when studying the impact of demand growth on (pre-entry) collusion,
it is crucial to try and disentangle the pro-collusive intrinsic effect of
demand growth from the impact of entry and other factors affected by
market growth so as to assess their relative strengths. By so doing, the
current paper sheds some light on the understanding of why the EC and
the CFI usually interpret demand growth as a factor hindering collusion,
an interpretation which contrasts with the conclusion of tacit collusion
models with growing demand where the possibility of entry is assumed
away.
Appendix A: Profits
In this section, we derive the per-period profits earned by each firm in
three alternative scenarios: Cournot oligopoly, collusion and one-shot
deviation from the collusive norm.
A.1 Cournot
In a Cournot–Nash equilibrium for the single period game played in
period t when there are n firms in the industry, a representative firm i


















q j,t + 2qi,t
)
= 0. (A2)
By symmetry, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, qi,t = qt. Hence, the individual out-
put rate in period t is
q ct (n) =
µt
n + 1 . (A3)













Assume now that in period t there are n firms colluding in the market.
Let q̃t ≡ qtµt denote the individual collusive output rate, where qt ∈
[ 12n ,
1
n+1 ). Then, it is straightforward to show that the industry output
rate and the individual profits in this period t are given by
Q̃t = nqtµt , (A6)
π̃t(qt, n) = p̃tq̃t = (1 − nqt)qtµt. (A7)
A.3 Deviation
If a given firm is considering deviating in period t, when each firm
is supposed to produce q̃t ≡ qtµt, then the deviating firm optimal




1 − (n − 1)qtµ






The associated FOC is:
1 − (n − 1)qtµ
t + 2q dt
µt
= 0. (A9)
Hence, very simple algebra shows that:
q dt =
1 − (n − 1)qt
2
µt. (A10)
In addition, the industry output rate and the deviator’s individual profit
are, respectively, given by
Qdt =
(
(n − 1)qtµt + q dt




πdt (q , n) =
(




Appendix B: Delayed Entry
In this section, we discuss a side result of the analysis regarding the
optimal time of entry. In the analysis above, entry is optimized (see
Proposition 2 and Lemma 1). It is interesting to note, however, that the
optimal entry time may not coincide with the time period in which the
Net Present Value (NPV) of the entrant’s expected profits becomes non-
negative. This is shown in the following Lemma:
Lemma 3: Let t denote the first period in time at which the NPV of the
entrant’s expected profits is positive. The entrant will optimally choose to enter
in period t + τ, τ ∈ {1, 2, . . .} rather than in period t if the following condition
holds
(1 − (µδ)τ )K < 
µt(1 + µδ + · · · + (µδ)τ−1) < (1 − δτ )K, (B1)
where 
 is given by (17).
Proof . By definition, t is the first period in time at which the NPV of the
entrant’s expected profits is positive. In addition, the entrant’s payoff
in each period t ≥ t is π et = 
µt, where 
 is given by (17). Hence, the
following condition must hold because it just requires that entering in







1 − µδ > K, (B2)
or, equivalently,

µt > (1 − µδ)K . (B3)
Now, from the point of view of period t money, delaying entry to











µi − K, (B4)
δτ
µt+τ




1 − µδ − K, (B5)
or, equivalently,
(1 − δτ )K > 
µ
t
1 − µδ (1 − (µδ)
τ ). (B6)
Now, making use of the fact that 1 − (µδ)τ = (1 − (µδ))(1 + µ δ +
· · · + (µδ)τ−1), conditions (B3) and (B6) can, respectively, be rewritten
as follows(
1 + µδ + · · · + (µδ)τ−1
)

µt > (1 − (µδ)τ )K, (B7)
(1 − δτ )K > 
µt (1 + µδ + · · · + (µδ)τ−1) . (B8)
Hence, conditions (B2) and (B4) (or, equivalently, (B7) and (B8))
will simultaneously hold if
(1 − (µδ)τ ) K < 
µt
(
1 + µδ + · · · + (µδ)τ−1
)
< (1 − δτ ) K .
This completes the proof. 
Hence, contrary to what happens in standard supergame models of
collusion that examine entry in a context where demand is constant over
time, in our setting the optimal entry time may not correspond to the first
period in time at which the NPV of the entrant’s payoff is non negative.
The intuition behind this result is simple. Notice that a profitable entry
in period t can be based on very low profits in the initial periods (say,
periods t, t + 1, . . . , t + τ − 1) and substantially higher profits in future
periods (due to a highly increasing demand). By contrast, the entry cost
is constant throughout time, which explains why entry can be optimally
delayed (to period t + τ ). While the delay costs τ periods of profits, it
also delays the payment of the entry costs for τ periods. We can then
have the latter benefit outweighing the former cost, and entry in period t
having a positive NPV of post entry profits, if the condition put forward
in the previous Lemma is satisfied.
This result is not central to the analysis and is related to the
restriction that there exists a single potential entry in the market. Notice,
however, that it will not disappear for any other number of potential
entrants. If this number is finite, then competition between potential
entrants will imply that every entrant but the last one would enter as
soon as its NPV of profits becomes non negative. However, the last
entrant will face a trade-off similar to the one described above for the
single potential entrant case and, therefore, may decide to delay its entry
beyond that point.
Appendix C: Proofs
C.1 Proof of Lemma 2
Making use of (44) and setting qt = 1/4, some algebra shows that the























9 + 7µδ − 28(µδ)t̂2) ≤ 0. (C2)
So, because, by definition, t1 ≥ 1 (see Proposition 2) and µδ < 1, a
sufficient condition for the previous ICC to hold is that:
9 + 7µδ − 28(µδ)t̂2 ≤ 0. (C3)
Now, take a pre-entry period t = t̂1 − k, where 1 ≤ k ≤ t̂1. Making
use of (44), and setting qt = 1/4 for all periods t̂1 − k ≤ t ≤ t̂1 − 1, one
























Multiplying both sides of the previous ICC by δ t̂1−k(1 − µδ), and after




9 − 17µδ + 24(µδ)k − 28(µδ)t̂2 ) ≤ 0. (C5)
So, in order for the previous ICC to hold, it is sufficient that the following
condition is satisfied:
9 − 17µδ + 24(µδ)k − 28(µδ)t̂2 = (9 + 7µδ − 28(µδ)t̂2)
− 24µδ(1 − (µδ)k−1) ≤ 0. (C6)
So, clearly, if condition (C3) holds, condition (C6) holds as well (remem-
ber that µδ < 1). This implies that the ICC in period t̂1 − 1 is the binding
pre-entry ICC.
C.2 Proof of Proposition 3
Making use of (44), some algebra shows that the ICC in period t = t̂1 − 1



















Now, from (42), it is clear that collusion possibilities are enhanced
when t̂1 increases and when t̂2 decreases. When t̂1 increases, the l.h.s. of
the ICC (42) increases whereas the r.h.s is not affected. With an increase
in t̂1, there will be an increase in the number of periods in which the
incumbent firms earn the pre-entry most collusive duopoly profit and,
therefore, also a decrease in the number of periods in which they earn the
most collusive triopoly profits. This effect contributes to an increase in
the extent of collusion which can be sustained pre-entry, simply because
it increases the continuation value of collusion at every period pre-
entry. On the other hand, when t̂2 decreases, the r.h.s of the ICC (42)
decreases whereas the l.h.s. is not affected. With a decrease in t̂2, we
will have a shorter first phase of the punishment in which firms earn
the Cournot duopoly profits in each period and a longer second phase
of the punishment in which firms earn the Cournot triopoly profits in
each period: the punishment becomes harsher which contributes to an
increase in the maximal level of pre-entry sustainable collusion.
Notice that from Proposition 2 and Lemma 1, one has that t̂i ∈
{ti, ti} and |ti − t̂i | ≤ 1, for i = 1, 2. Now, in order to avoid integer
problems and because we are looking for a sufficient condition such that
no collusion can be sustained as a MCTSEE in any period t < t̂1, in what
follows, let us focus on the (extreme case) values of t̂1 and t̂2 that most
facilitate collusion possibilities. Formally, let t̂1 = t1 + 1 and t̂2 = t2 − 1,
where t1 and t2 are, respectively, given by equations (18) and (32). When



















Multiplying both sides of the previous ICC by δt1 (1 − µδ), and after
some rearranging, one obtains:
(1 − 3qt)2
4




4 − 7(µδ)t2−2). (C9)
Now, because, by definition, t1 ≥ 1 (see Proposition 2), µδ < 1 and
qt ∈ [1/4, 1/3), the previous ICC will not hold if g(µ, δ) > 0, where:
g(µ, δ) = 4 − 7(µδ)t2−2. (C10)
The rest of this proof identifies conditions under which g(µ, δ) > 0.
This will be done in three steps.
Step 1. Show that limδ→1/µg(µ, δ) < 0.
As a preliminary remark, notice that because µδ < 1, one must
have that δ < 1/µ.
Now, let us start by computing the limiting value of the optimal
entry time off the equilibrium path:
t∗2 ≡ lim
δ→1/µ
















where the last equality comes from the application of the l’Hôpital’s rule.
Now, making use of equations (C10) and (C11), it is straightforward to
conclude that limδ→1/µg(µ, δ) = −3 < 0.
Step 2. Show that limδ→4/(7µ)g(µ, δ) > 0.
Notice first that we are focusing attention on the case in which
perfect collusion can be sustained ex post entry, µδ > 4/7 (Corollary 1),
which in turn implies that δ > 4/(7µ). Now,
lim
δ→4/(7µ)





So, in order for limδ→4/(7µ)g(µ, δ) > 0, one must have that t∗2 > 3
and this will be true if K > µ2 K̃ , where K̃ is given by equation (38).
Step 3. Apply the intermediate value theorem
Fix a value of µ > 1. Because the function g(µ, δ) is continuous in
δ for all δ ∈ [4/(7µ), 1/µ) and limδ→4/(7µ)g(µ, δ) > 0, limδ→1/µg(µ, δ) < 0
then the equation g(µ, δ) = 0 for some δ̃ ∈ [4/(7µ), 1/µ).
Thus, when 4/7 ≤ µδ ≤ µδ̃, no qt ∈ [1/4, 1/3) can be supported as
a MCTSEE in period t = t̂1 − 1. Now, in period t̂1 − 2, firms anticipate
that Cournot competition will take place in the following period in-
dependently of their choices in the current period. This implies that
they will also play Cournot in period t̂1 − 2. By backward induction, the
same reasoning can be extended to the previous periods. So, collusion
cannot be enforced as a MCTSEE in any period t < t̂1. This completes the
proof.
C.3 Proof of Proposition 4
Take the ICC in period t = t̂1 − 1, given by equation (C7). Now, as
explained in the proof of proposition 3, collusion possibilities are
enhanced when t̂1 increases and when t̂2 decreases. Moreover, from
Proposition 2 and Lemma 1, one has that t̂i ∈ {ti, ti} and |ti − t̂i | ≤ 1,
for i = 1, 2. Now, to avoid integer problems and because we are looking
for a sufficient condition such that perfect collusion can be sustained as a
MCTSEE in period t = t̂1 − 1, in what follows, let us focus on the values
of t̂1 and t̂2 that most hurt collusion possibilities. Formally, let t̂1 = t1 − 1
and t̂2 = t2 + 1, where t1 and t2 are, respectively, given by equations (18)



















Notice as well that because we are looking for the equilibrium
in which there is perfect collusion both before and after entry, qt =
1/4. Knowing this, multiplying both sides of the previous ICC by





7 + 9(µδ)−1 − 28(µδ)t2) ≤ 0. (C14)
Now, because, by definition, t1 ≥ 1 (see Proposition 2), the previous ICC
will hold if f (µ, δ) < 0, where
f (µ, δ) = 7 + 9 (µδ)−1 − 28 (µδ)t2 . (C15)
In the remaining of the proof, we look for conditions under which
f (µ, δ) < 0. This will be done in three steps.
Step 1. Show that limδ→1/µ f (µ, δ) < 0.
Notice that because µδ < 1, one must have that δ < 1/µ. Moreover,
and as shown in the proof of Proposition 3, t∗2 ≡ limδ→1/µt2 ≥ 1 (see
equation (C11)). So, making use of equations (C11) and (C15), it is
straightforward to conclude that limδ→1/µf (µ, δ) = −12 < 0.
Step 2. Show that limδ→4/(7µ)f (µ, δ) > 0.
We are assuming that perfect collusion can be sustained after entry,
µδ > 4/7 (Corollary 1), which in turn implies that δ > 4/(7µ). Now,
lim
δ→4/(7µ)








Now, because t∗2 ≥ 1 (see equation (C11)), the previous inequality
always holds.
Step 3. Apply the intermediate value theorem
Fix a value of µ > 1. Because the function f (µ, δ) is continuous in
δ for all δ ∈ [4/(7µ), 1/µ) and limδ→4/(7µ)f (µ, δ) > 0, limδ→1/µf (µ, δ) < 0
then the equation f (µ, δ) = 0 for some δ∗ ∈ [4/(7µ), 1/µ).
Thus, when µδ > µδ∗ ≥ 4/7, perfect collusion can be sustained as
a MCTSEE both after entry and also in the period immediately before
entry takes place (period t̂1 − 1). Now, applying Lemma 2, it is straight-
forward to conclude that when µδ > µδ∗ ≥ 4/7, perfect collusion can be
sustained as a MCTSEE in any period before entry. This completes the
proof.
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